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Abstract: It is very easy to run applications in Docker. Docker offers an ecosystem that offers a  
platform for application packaging, distributing and managing within containers. However, Docker 
platform is yet not matured. Presently, Docker is less secured as compare to virtual machines (VM) 
and most of the other cloud technologies. The key of reason of Docker’s inadequate security protocols 
is; containers sharing of Linux kernel, which can lead to risk of privileged escalations. This research is 
going to outline some major security vulnerabilities at Docker and counter solutions to neutralize such 
attacks. There are variety of security attacks like insider and outsider. This research will outline both 
types of attacks and their mitigations strategies. Taking some precautionary measures can save from 
huge disasters. This research will also present Docker secure deployment guidelines. These guidelines 
will suggest different configurations to deploy Docker containers in a more secure way.  
Keywords: Docker; LXC; Container; Virtual Machines (VMs); Linux kernel  
I. INTRODUCTION 
People have always been doubtful regarding the security of 
cloud technologies since their inception. People don’t trust on 
cloud computing security aspects entirely as this is still 
emerging phenomena. In fact, the security vendors design a 
marketing response for clients by using traditional terms to 
market their products [1]. Though still a number of issues 
lurking around but new cloud security solutions are 
mitigating many security and privacy vulnerabilities.  
Currently, cloud technologies are transforming 
traditional technology with new and more efficient practices 
[2,3]. One of such example is containers. Containers are 
considered as future of virtual machines (VM). 
Container-based virtualization is also known as operating 
system virtualization, which allows virtualization layer to run 
as an application within the operating system (OS) [4]. 
Containers appeared as micro virtual machines, more light 
weight and more efficient because there is just one operating 
system (OS) managing all hardware calls. 
Currently container model is misrepresented. Apparently 
container technology looks secure, that it contains all 
dependences in one package. However it doesn’t ensure its 
security. Container platforms are also vulnerable as other 
cloud platforms. There are number of threats which are 
threating from inside and outside [5].  
Virtual environments offer a great deal of challenge to 
run services with great security, particularly in a multi-tenant 
cloud system [6]. It is already established that virtual 
machines (VMs) developed through hypervisor based 
virtualization methods are highly secured as compare to 
containers. The key reason behind this aspect is that VMs 
add an additional layer of isolation among the host and the 
applications. 
VM based applications are only allowed to 
communicate with the VM kernel, not to the host kernel. So, 
an attacker has to bypass the VM kernel and the hypervisor 
before an attack can be made to the host kernel. On the other 
hand, containers model offers application to directly access 
and communicate with the host kernel as shown in Fig. 1. 
Such situation permits attacker to directly hit host kernel. 
This is one of the key aspects that raise the security concerns 
about the container technology as compared to VM 
platforms.    
 
Fig.1. VMs vs. Container 
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Currently, Docker appeared as one of the top 
container-based virtualization platform. Docker containers 
also suffer from same security vulnerabilities. Docker 
demonstrates the idea of less friction; however security is just 
opposite to it.  
The research is aimed to offer a deep insight of Docker and 
its analysis which leads to following research question. Is 
Docker offering a safe environment to run applications? The 
analysis will discover some of the key security 
vulnerabilities which are currently threating Docker. This 
research will also highlight the key mitigation policies to 
avoid such issues. This analysis will attempt to assess 
majority of security threats internally as well as externally.  
The initial section of this paper is about the detailed 
overview of Docker platform. The second section will 
outline some of the major security issues and their mitigation 
strategies. The third section will outline recommendations 
for security deployment of containers at Docker platform 
and a new evolutionary hybrid architecture that is more 
secure and efficient. The last section is based on conclusion 
and recommendations.  
II. DOCKER OVERVIEW  
Docker has quickly turned out as one of the leading projects 
for containerizing applications. Docker platform was 
initiated as an open source project that allows packing, 
shipping and running applications in lightweight containers. 
Docker containers offer unique capabilities of 
platform-agnostic and hardware-agnostic. These containers 
do not have any dependences regarding particular 
framework, language or packaging system. Docker 
containers can run within any technology based environment. 
This capability make these containers independent from 
particular stack or provider [7].  
Solomon Hykes initiated Docker as an open-source 
internal project at dotCloud, which is a platform-as-a-service 
(PaaS) company. The initial version of open source Docker 
was released in March 2013. Docker was designed to utilize 
different interfaces to access virtualization characteristics of 
the Linux kernel as shown in Fig.2. Initially Docker was 
utilizing LXC as the default execution environment for its 
platform. However, on release of version 0.9 on March 13, 
2014, Docker dropped LXC and introduced its own 
libcontainer library. Go programming language was used to 
write Docker libcontainer library [8].  
 
Fig.2. Docker uses virtualization features of the Linux kernel 
Process of developing containers on Docker is based on 
number of steps. For developing container, we search for 
images in local Docker library. Docker offers images 
command lists locally to create a Docker container. However, 
if required image is not available then it can be downloaded 
from the central Docker repository. The next step is to build 
a container as well formulating necessary changes. The 
whole process is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig.3. Developing a Docker container 
Till now number of popular technology organizations 
worldwide showed their interest and dependence on Docker. 
Organizations like Red Hat, Google, IBM, Google, Amadeus 
IT Group and Cisco Systems have already contributed to 
Docker at great level. Red Hat is one of biggest contributor 
of Docker containers. Recently Red hat announced that now 
users can run Docker containers on Red Hat Enterprise 
Linux 7 (RHEL 7) and Red Hat Enterprise Linux Atomic 
(based on RHEL 7) systems [9].  
On August 12, 2015, new version of Docker 1.8 was 
announced. This new version offers new capabilities of 
content trust, toolbox and updates to registry and 
                                                                                                             3 
orchestration. This new version will also offer support for 
image signing, a new installer, and incremental 
improvements to Engine, Swarm, Compose, Machine and 
Registry [10]. Docker 1.8 version offers support for users of 
Mac OS X, Linux and Windows versions  
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Current growing technology market demands enhanced 
virtualization technologies. Though a number of 
virtualization methods are not flexible enough to satisfy 
developer needs. Most of virtualization technology solutions 
offer considerable overhead that turn out to be a burden on 
the scalability of the infrastructure. 
In such situations, Docker has evolved a light weight 
virtualization solution that minimize the overhead through 
containerization of applications and services [11]. Docker 
offers the same kernel as the host system to minimize the 
resources overhead, though this technique can expose 
containers to a number of security risks if not effectively 
configured [12].  
Running services in multi-tenant cloud based virtual 
environment presents security as one of key challenges. VM 
allows an application to only communicate with the VM 
kernel, not with the host kernel. Conversely, containers 
based applications are able to directly communicate with the 
host kernel [13,14]. This is one of key weak point for 
containers security and privacy management. Docker is also 
based on similar container-based virtualization methodology, 
also having same security vulnerabilities. 
To analyze the security vulnerabilities of Docker, we 
have to assess two sides of system, ‘outsider’ and ‘insider'. 
Security attacks can be happened from outside as well as 
inside of the system. Outsider attacks try to get access to 
container and damage the data and exploit resources. While 
insider attacks carried out by a malicious user present inside, 
through getting access to the Docker commands. The basic 
objective of both kinds of attacker is same, to damage and 
exploit container intellectual resources. 
For example, a simple command (given below) can do huge 
damage if your system is not properly configured. The below 
given command is executed through dummy flag:   
 
The above stated command deletes all of host’s /usr folder. So, 
we can assess that how much a system can be damaged if 
security precautions are not taken properly.  
The objective of this analysis is to find out most 
vulnerable security issues (insider/outsider) and suggest some 
precautions and mitigation strategies to counter such attacks.    
Insider attacks can be managed through some simple 
configurations. Running Docker Daemon with –selinux flag 
will prevent containers from doing damage to the host 
system through developing additional security layer. Further 
details of different insider attacks are outlined in coming 
sections.  
Let’s consider security of the container in comparison to 
the security of a ship. The ship acts like a dock. It can build 
very strong and secure container, however if the ship is 
insecure, it doesn’t matter how strong the container is? 
Similarly, a great deal of care should be taken to avoid 
outsider attacks. Through removing capabilities of containers, 
a number of outsider security threats can be avoided. 
Container capabilities are the partition of root into 32 
different categories. By default many of these capabilities are 
disabled in Docker containers. For instance, by default, 
Docker container’ IPTables rules cannot be manipulated. For 
disabling all of these capabilities, the command is given 
below: 
 
IV. DEFENDING AGAINST SECURITY ATTACKS  
Security is now one of key aspects for cloud application. 
Docker also suffers from number of security attacks. This 
section will outline different insider and outsider security 
attacks and their mitigation policies.  
1. Kernel Exploits 
Kernel mange and deal all container operations and 
processes. In case of a kernel-level exploit, the applications 
running inside containers are at the verge of compromising 
and exploit. All containers share the same kernel architecture 
[5]. In this situation, if some contained application is 
hijacked and obtain some privileged rights of kernel, then 
such condition leads to compromise all running containers as 
well as host platform. Likewise, there is no possibility that 
two containers utilize different versions of the same kernel 
docker run --dontpastethis --privileged -v 
/usr:/usr busybox rm -rf /usr 
 
docker run -ti --cap-drop ALL debian /bin/bash    
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module. 
Docker is currently taking security very seriously and 
trying to offer more solid and effective solutions to tackle 
and deal major security issues. To deal with kernel level 
exploits Docker specifically recommends following 
precautions to implement a secure and safe cloud 
environment.     
It is recommended that AppArmor or SELinux should 
be executed while running Docker Engine. 
Docker states that mutually-trusted containers should 
be mapped together in groups at separate machines. 
Untrusted applications should not be running with root 
privileges. Docker Engine has also started support for user 
namespaces which will offer an additional layer of security 
for containers. 
To avert kernel exploits, container file system must be set to 
read-only. Through turning off inter-container 
communication, such attacks can be avoided. Avoiding 
unnecessary package installations in the container is also a 
good way to keep such dangers away.  
2. Denial of Service (Dos) Attacks 
Denial-of-Service or DoS is one of the most well-known 
attacks on network resources. In such attacks a process or a 
group of processes try to consume the entire resources of the 
system, thus breaking down or disrupting normal processing 
or operations. 
In containers based processing architecture all 
containers share kernel resources. DoS condition happens 
when one container exploits access to a resource. In such 
conditions, it will starve out all other containers.  
To encounter such attacks, there is a need for OS-level 
virtualization solution that should fulfill requirements like: 
file system isolation, process isolation, IPC isolation, device 
isolation, network isolation and controlling resource 
allocation [5]. 
So, through controlling resource allocation to each 
container, such attacks can be prevented. Docker implements 
Cgroups as a key tool to deal with such issues. Cgroups 
control and manage the resource limits, e.g. CPU time, 
memory space, and disk I/O that any Docker container can 
use. They ensure that every container gets its fair share of 
the resources and avoiding any container monopolizes all 
resources. Moreover, Cgroups allow Docker to control and 
configure resource allocation constraints for every container. 
For instance, one such constraint is controlling the CPUs 
availability to a specific container [5]. 
3. Container Breakouts 
In such attacks an attacker breakout a container, then he/she 
be able to get access to the host and other containers. After 
getting access, the attacker will be able to access files 
outside the container. 
open_by_handle_at() function allows process to access 
files on a mounted filesystem through file_handle structure. 
file_handle structure utilize inode numbers to distinguish 
files. To call this function needs 
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH capability. A superuser inside 
a container is having this capability by default. This allows 
an attacker to bypass simfs constraints and access the entire 
files on a primary filesystem comprising other VE’s residing 
on the similar filesystem.  
According to Docker’s website, container breakout 
issue and vulnerability was only present until Docker version 
0.11. According to the new details this vulnerability was 
fixed in Docker 0.12, which was ultimately turned out to be 
Docker 1.0. 
To mitigate such kind of security vulnerabilities there is 
a need to set container file system to read-only. Running 
containers with the privileged flag can be dangerous and can 
cause such kind of security attacks. Setting containers 
volumes to read-only is an effective way for discouraging 
container breakout.   
4. Poisoned Images 
Container Images may be injected through some virus or 
trojan infected software. Problem of poisoned images also 
happens if someone is running outdated, known-vulnerable 
software versions.   
According to Docker, a downloaded image is “verified” 
by system. This verification is solely based on the presence 
of a signed manifest. Though Docker never authenticates 
downloaded image checksum from the manifest. In such 
situations, an attacker could transmit any image together 
with a signed manifest. Such kind of security issues can lead 
to numerous serious vulnerabilities [15]. 
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In Docker, images are downloaded from an HTTPS 
server. These images pass through an insecure streaming 
processing pipeline inside Docker daemon:  [decompress] 
-> [tarsum] -> [unpack]. 
Inside Docker, this pipeline is effective, however, extremely 
unprotected. Therefore, there is a need that unauthenticated 
input steam should not be assessed before confirming its 
digital signature.  
Docker users need to be alert that the code used for 
downloading images is shockingly insecure. In this scenario, 
users should only download authenticated and trusted 
images. Another better option to manage such security issues 
is to block index.docker.io locally. Through this, a user will 
be able to download and authenticate images manually 
before importing to Docker platform through Docker load.  
5. Compromised Secrets 
Compromising business or personal secrets are the big 
security dangers in container based technology. In case of 
theft of API keys and database passwords; the overall system 
can be compromised. Docker allows user to run multiple 
containers at the same time. In case of security breach, 
overall services and operations can be disrupted. So a lot 
more is needed to be done to protect database passwords and 
API keys. Such details must be kept secret to avoid any 
possible security breach.  
To further protect Docker from such attacks, there is a 
need to set container file system to read-only option. For 
sharing secrets, utilizing environment variables is not a good 
option. Running containers without privileged flags will also 
be considered a great help to avoid compromising security 
attacks.    
6. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM)  
In such attacks a malicious actor inserts himself/herself into 
a communication among two legitimate parties. Such 
attacker monitor, alter or steal valuable information which 
transmits among two parties.     
To avoid such attacks in containers, network isolation 
is the most significant aspects to prevent such network-based 
attacks. There is a need to configure containers in such a 
way that they are incapable to manipulate or eavesdrop on 
the network traffic of the host or other containers [5]. 
In this scenario, OpenVPN (open virtual private 
network) offers a best way to implement virtual private 
networks (VPNs) by means of TLS (Transport Layer 
Security) encryption. OpenVPN defends the network traffic 
from man-in-the-middle attacks and eavesdropping.  
Docker offers an easy way to encapsulate the 
OpenVPN server. In this way OpenVPN server process and 
configuration of data can be managed more easily at Docker' 
platforms. Image of the Docker OpenVPN is prebuilt. It 
contains everything that is necessary to run the server in a 
well-balanced and persistent environment. Docker includes 
scripts those considerably automate the standard use case, 
however if desired, it also offers full manual configuration. 
A Docker volume container is utilized to hold the EasyRSA 
PKI and also configuration certificate data. 
7. ARP spoofing 
ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) spoofing is a kind of 
security attack in which an attacker sends fake ARP 
messages over a LAN (local area network). In such attacks, 
attacker is able to link his/her MAC address with the IP 
address of a legitimate system on the network. As the 
attacker’s MAC address is linked to legitimate IP address, 
the attacker will start getting each and every bit of data from 
that specific IP address.  
Initially, Docker developers paid less attention to the 
fact, that the so‐called ARP is employed to map IPv4 to 
Ethernet hardware (MAC) addresses, which can also be 
utilized by the virtual bridge to distribute the Ethernet 
frames to right container. As ARP packets are not filtered so 
there is no security mechanism available in ARP itself. 
Therefore containers can certainly imitate other containers or 
even the host. Such situations can present an ARP spoofing 
or ARP cache poisoning attack scenario. The NDP (Neighbor 
Discovery Protocol) in IPv6 is used in the similar way.  
If an attacker gains access to one of the containers, 
through compromising the container’s security, the attacker 
can obtain, manipulate or redirect any information of the 
bridge. This information can be any traffic running among 
containers and the outside world. In such situations, attacker 
might sniff any secret details (passwords) sent between web 
application and database containers. Moreover, attacker will 
also be capable to inject malicious payload into network 
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connections. 
To mitigate such security attacks, there are number of 
ways; one of the most powerful ways to save container, is to 
run the container without NET_RAW capability. In this way, 
programs inside container will not be able to create 
PF_PACKET sockets. Without PF_PACKET sockets, ARP 
spoofing attack cannot be performed. This method has few 
drawbacks. 
Another more suitable way to protect Docker container 
from such attacks; is to utilize “ebtables” to filter out 
Ethernet frames. In this way, ARP packets with wrong 
sender protocol or hardware address (ARP spoofing) can be 
caught and detected [16]. It also allows filtering out the 
incorrect source addresses (MAC spoofing). In this situation, 
attacker has no chance to perform ARP spoofing attack.  
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION  
1. Access Control Policy Modules 
We have proposed a solution that is a simple and more 
reliable. This is based on access control methodology to 
ensure appropriate access management. It is based on 
specific SELinux types of containerized procedures in a 
more clear way for the client. In this method image 
maintainers ship the SELinux policy module together with 
their images to the host platform. Here the module will be 
placed on the host system and outlines the types that will be 
linked with the processes in the Docker image. SELinux 
modules and aforementioned Policy Modules (PM) have to 
fulfill the properties to not to pose a threat to the host system 
[17]. The policy modules for an image will be stated in the 
Docker file and placed in the image metadata at their 
build-time. For running containerized processes along with 
some SELinux types, the image-maintainer is able to label 
the binaries in the image by particular types, and write a type 
transition procedure. Thus, the process is allocated to the 
SELinux type stated in the rule, when the binary is executed. 
It is possible to run different SELinux labels, even if 
multiple processes have been running at the similar the same 
image. When a Docker container holds different images, all 
the policy modules for the images that comprise the 
container will be installed. It also offers SELinux types 
intended for processes in the parent images.  
The Docker Hub Registry has to ensure that policy modules 
must not alter the system policy as well as can only have an 
influence on processes and resources linked with the DPM 
itself. Fig. 4 shows that two Docker containers (apache, and 
mysql) are running, using explicit SELinux types stated in 
the policy modules inserted in the Docker images.  
It also needs to ensure that new types stated in policy 
modules have to always operate inside the boundaries 
defined through the svirt_lxc_net_t type. A policy model 
offers the flexibility of outlining numerous types with 
diverse privileges. Consequently, a container can switch to 
the least privilege domain required to obtain the present task. 
Fig.4. Two Docker containers running processes in, using 
SELinux types based Policy Modules 
2. Secure Deployment Guidelines 
Taking precautionary security measures can save us from 
huge vulnerabilities. The same case is with the Docker 
container security. By taking number of precautionary 
measures for Docker container security, more secure and 
reliable applications could be developed. This section will 
outline some secure deployment guidelines for Docker 
platform.        
2.1. Docker Images  
As discussed earlier that poisoned images are one of the key 
security issues at Docker. However, from Docker 1.3 and 
onward versions offer cryptographic signatures support. 
Through this approach, a user will be able to discover real 
origin and integrity of official repository images. This 
capability will reduce the dangers of poisoned images and 
also reduces the chances of possible security threats. It is 
highly recommended that all images should be downloaded 
from authenticated source and support cryptographic 
signatures. 
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2.2. Network Namespaces  
Running Docker on a TCP port can cause a serious security 
hazard for containers. Such approach permits anyone to get 
access to specific port to obtain access to container. This 
leads to get root access on the host or may be to Docker 
group. Therefore, it is critically required to ensure that 
communications are adequately encrypted using SSL while 
offering access to the daemon over TCP. This approach will 
prevent unauthorized parties from interacting with it.  
For more enhanced security management, kernel 
firewall iptables rules can be implemented to docker0. For 
example, the source IP range can be restricted for a Docker 
container [18]. This will prevent container from talking with 
the outside world. The following iptables filter is used to 
prevent such access.  
 
2.3. Logging & Auditing 
Logging and auditing offers an additional layer of security 
for Docker security management. In this way, a user can 
monitor the traffic to ensure that no suspicious activities are 
being performed. 
Following command can be used to access log files outside 
the container from the host: 
 
Log files can also be accessed by using the built-in Docker 
command: 
 
For permanent storage into a tarball, log files can be 
exported using following command: 
 
2.4. SELinux / AppArmor  
Docker offers Linux kernel security modules like AppArmor 
and Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux). These Linux based 
Linux kernel security modules can be configured through 
access control security policies. Through configuring these 
security modules, the users can implement mandatory access 
controls (MAC) for limiting set of system resources or 
privileges.  
Through configuring SELinux, Docker will have an 
additional layer of security through permission checking 
policy MAC. SELinux manage everything through labels. In 
Docker system, every process, file/directory and system 
object has a label. These labels are being used by system 
administrator to write rules to manage access between 
system objects and processes.  
Similar like SELinux, AppArmor is another MAC 
based security enhancement model to Linux. AppArmor 
offers control access to individual programs. Through this 
model administrator is able to load the security profile into 
every individual program to restrict and manage the 
capabilities of the program.  
These features are available in Docker version 1.3 and 
onwards. Docker offers an interface for loading AppArmor 
pre-defined profile while launching a new container on 
AppArmor supported systems  [19].  
To load SELinux or AppArmor security policies are 
using label confinement; intended for container. It can be 
configured using the newly added --security-opt argument in 
Docker as shown below:   
 
2.5. Daemon Privileges  
It is recommended not to use the --privileged command 
because --privileged command will permit the container to 
access the all devices on host as well as it would provide the 
container with explicit LSM (i.e AppArmor or SELinux) 
iptables -t filter -A FORWARD -s 
<source_ip_range> -j REJECT --reject-with 
icmp-admin-prohibited 
 
docker run -v /dev/log:/dev/log 
<container_name> /bin/sh 
 
docker logs ... (-f to follow log output)  
 
docker export ... 
 
--security-opt="label:user:USER" : Set the label 
user for the container 
--security-opt="label:role:ROLE" : Set the label 
role for the container 
--security-opt="label:type:TYPE" : Set the label 
type for the container 
--security-opt="label:level:LEVEL" : Set the 
label level for the container 
--security-opt="apparmor:PROFILE" : Set the 
apparmor profile to be applied to the container  
Example: docker run 
--security-opt=label:level:s0:c100,c200 -i -t 
centos bash 
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configuration. LSM configuration would give the similar 
level of control as host processes [18].  
Through avoiding --privileged command could help to 
diminish the security risks and host compromises. A 
legitimate user should have the ability to launch the daemon 
by using -u option. It can reduce the privileges which are 
enforced inside the container. For example: 
 
2.6. cgroups  
The cgroups, or control groups, offer a way for accounting 
as well as limiting the resources for every container. So 
cgroups offered great deal of capability to avoid the Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks through restricting system resource 
exhaustion [20].  
CPU usage: 
 
Memory usage: 
 
Storage usage: 
 
2.7. SUID/GUID binaries  
Buffer overflow security attacks can be serious for 
containers. To avoid such attacks, SUID and SGID binaries 
should be prohibited. This can be achieved by decreasing the 
capabilities offered to containers by specific command line 
arguments. 
 
Another way is to mount filesystem with the nosuid 
attribute. By applying this command, a user can avoid SUID 
resultant buffer overflow security attacks.  
2.8. Devices control group (/dev/*)  
Device isolation is also one of the key ways to avoid number 
of security vulnerabilities. By default containers includes all 
permissions. To avoid such issues there is a need that devices 
should be mount by means of the “--device" option which is 
built-in and don’t use “-v” with the “--privileged" argument 
[21].  
A set of strict permissions can be utilized for device by 
means of third set of options; “rwm” to override read, write, 
and mknod permissions respectively. For example, sound 
card read-only permission can be set by following command:  
 
2.9. Services and Applications  
If a Docker container security is compromised; while there 
are number of sensitive services running, such situations can 
lead to huge disaster. So, to avoid such situation, consider 
isolating sensitive services. Through running sensitive 
services (SSH service) on bastion host or in a VM we can 
add an additional security layer into our system. Also 
untrusted applications should be avoided to run with root 
privileges within containers. 
2.10. Linux Kernel  
Sometimes out-dated kernels are more likely to be exposed 
to publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is so 
important that kernel is up-to-date with updated utility 
offered by the system (e.g. apt-get, yum, etc). There is a 
great deal of effective security against memory corruption 
bugs, through using kernel with GRSEC or PAX. 
2.11. User Namespaces  
Currently, user namespaces are not directly supported by 
Docker. However, they can be used by Docker’ containers 
on supported kernels, through applying the clone syscall, or 
using the ‘unshare’ feature. UID mapping is presently 
supported through the LXC driver, however; not in the 
native libcontainer library.  
User namespaces feature would permit the Docker daemon 
to execute as an unprivileged user on the host [22]. However, 
this Docker daemon will appear as executing like root inside 
containers.  
2.12. libseccomp (and seccomp-bpf extension)  
Syscall processes are not significant to system operation. It 
should be restricted in order to avoid abuse or misuse inside 
a compromised container. To restrict Linux kernel’s syscall 
procedures, libseccomp library is used. This feature is 
presently under-development. This features available in LXC 
docker run -u <username> -it <container_name> 
/bin/bash 
 
docker run -it --rm --cpuset=0,1 -c 2 ...  
 
docker run -it --rm -m 128m ...  
 
docker -d --storage-opt dm.basesize=5G  
 
docker run -it --rm --cap-drop SETUID 
--cap-drop SETGID ...  
 
docker run --device=/dev/snd:/dev/snd:r ...  
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driver but not in libcontainer.  
Docker daemon can be restarted to use the LXC driver by 
using following command: 
 
2.13. Full Virtualization  
Escalation from the container to the host can be so 
dangerous. It can happen if kernel vulnerability is exploited 
inside the Docker image. To prevent such issues, use full 
virtualization solutions that contain Docker, for example 
KVM. Docker offers capability to nest Docker images to 
offer KVM virtualization layer. (Docker-in-Docker utility) 
2.14. Security Audits  
Security audits are one of the key ways to protect system 
from major security risks. Host system and containers should 
be audited regularly to assess and identify any vulnerabilities 
and misconfigurations if any. These vulnerabilities and 
mis-configurations could become dangerous for our systems 
and may compromise intellectual resources [23]. 
2.15. Multi-tenancy Environments  
Containers should run on dedicated hosts. It is very 
important for the security of containers. It becomes more 
important when user is dealing with some sensitive 
operations.  
It is recommended because of the shared nature of 
Docker containers’ kernel. Therefore, multi-tenancy 
environments of Docker containers’ kernel can offer secure 
separation of duty. So, it is highly suggested that containers 
should be running on dedicated hosts [24].  
More secure environment can also be achieved through 
reducing the inter-container communications to a very small 
level. It can be achieved by setting the Docker daemon to 
utilize --icc=false. Also it is useful to specify -link with 
Docker run when required.  
2.16. Docker Content Trust  
Content Trust is a new feature that can offer an additional 
layer of security for containers. It is open-source software 
that is able to offer legitimacy of container images. This 
feature is added in Docker version 1.8.0. It will allow 
Docker users to conform the legitimacy of container images 
(available at any public Docker Hub) before downloading 
Docker images [25].  
The basic idea behind this feature is to secure the 
Docker platform and offer assurance to users that they won’t 
be deploying anything possibly hazardous atop their 
technology infrastructure. 
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The proposed guidelines offer a great deal of capability to 
protect against any attacks from malicious client or network. 
Adopting the aforementioned methodologies and guidelines 
will ensure a great deal of capability to protect systems 
against possible breaches. The proposed SELinux types 
based Policy Modules for access control will ensure better 
security and improved access management of possible 
insider and outsider attacks. Application of these policy 
modules for different images will offer a comprehensive 
firewall.   
To perform a network defensive drill we have to know the 
difference between the efficiency among real world attacks 
and the simulation. Therefore, to test the proposed technique, 
DDoS program executed on the Docker container. 
Cyber-attacks program will produce a huge number of 
subroutines those are sending requests to attack the targets. 
Docker container equipped with aforementioned tools and 
capabilities defended better as compared to naive Docker 
containers. Table 1. shows the experiment aspects where we 
run Docker version 1.2 on a native OS, with policy modules 
and specified guidelines. It can be seen that source to base 
presence of policy modules can ensure higher protection and 
security.          
Table 1. Policy Module Application 
 Target to Base 
Target to Policy 
Module 
Source to Base Threat Present Partial Threats 
Source to 
Policy Module 
Partial Threats No Threats 
 
In March 2015, Docker Inc. published a research, which 
offered a hybrid solution (Combining Containers and Virtual 
Machines) to enhance the security and isolation [26]. 
Regular Virtual machines cannot be scaled down up to the 
level of running a single application service. VMs are able to 
support the rich set of applications. However, this approach 
can present some conflicts among collaborating 
docker -d -e lxc  
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micro-services. On the other hand, running one 
micro-service per VM is so costly from resource point of 
view. To resolve these issues, Docker containers can be 
deployed in conjunction with VMs. This hybrid 
infrastructure will be based on combination of containers 
and VMs. It will allow running complete group of services 
in an isolated way and also it’s grouping inside of a virtual 
machine, as shown in Fig.5. 
 
Fig.5. Combining Containers and Virtual Machines 
One of the key features of this approach is the 
enhanced security by introducing two layers, VMs and 
containers, to the distributed applications. The other feature 
of this technique is to utilize resources in a better way. 
Moreover, it increases the density of containers; whereas 
decreases the number of VMs necessary for the defined 
isolation and security objectives. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
Container applications are getting popular. Docker, LXC, 
Rocket or other projects are getting momentum in container 
application field. This technology is here to stay. As the 
technology and related processes are getting mature, they 
will address many of the risks, few of them have been 
outlined above. Docker Containers are offering a lightweight 
and efficient way to package application with all their 
dependencies. However, some security issues hindering their 
wide spread adoption. This research has addressed and 
outlined some potential security issues and vulnerabilities, 
and offer mitigation strategies to manage these issues. This 
research also outlines some security deployment strategies to 
deploy applications at Docker in a more security and safe 
way. These all guidelines and precautionary measures can 
offer a more secure and reliable container platform for future 
application development. Currently, Docker has offered its 
1.8 version with new updates and fixes. Now Docker is 
offering quite secure container based application 
development platform.  
Docker suggests that user can ensure security of 
processes through running inside the containers as 
non-privileged users (i.e., non-root). It is also recommended 
that by enabling SELinux, AppArmor, GRSEC, or hardening 
solution, we can add additional layer of security for our 
applications. Through configuring the right security policy 
and following the secure deployment guidelines we can 
ensure the greater security of Docker containers.  
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